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Introduction
Since its establishment in 1948, the State of Israel has utilized development, planning and
housing policies as key tools for crafting and shaping national space. This process aimed to
achieve the dual goal of outwardly defending state borders while internally Judaizing national
space (Yiftachel, 2006). Its outcomes, created a stratified socio-spatial system, which is based on
management and segregation of people along national, ethnic and class lines (Shenhav, 2003).
Although land ownership, spatial planning and housing supply were produced and managed
separately, in this paper we propose that it is more beneficial to examine them as complementary
elements that allowed for this national project to spatially materialize (Tzfadia and Yacobi,
2011). Yet, while the goals of the national project were only slightly altered since the
establishment of the state, the methods and logics through which they were deployed have
undergone significant transformations, due to both local and global changes.
During the first few decades, most land and planning resources were centrally managed,
regulated and distributed, whereas most housing development occurred through direct state
intervention. S
was accomplished by, inter alia, processes of privatization and de-regulation. In the
field of land-use planning, these tendencies entailed a dramatic shift from central, comprehensive
planning of the national space as a whole to piece-meal planning methods driven by private
entrepreneurship (Alterman, 1999; Alfasi 2006; Margalit, 2013). In terms of housing supply, a
noted shift occurred from the production and management of a public housing stock (mainly for
Jews) to the provision of subsidies to tenants as well as to private developers. Such changes may
2be perceived as an outcome of globalization processes which abate the control of the state over
the production of national space, and hence encroach on its ability to achieve national goals and
universal welfare (Castells, 1997; Bauman, 1998). This argument entails a contrast between the
national collective ethos and global neoliberalism (Ram, 2000), which implies that the
commodification of space results in the liberation of national space from its ethno-national
organizing logic.
Nevertheless, the growing body of literature concerning the relationship between global
and local processes, as well as between globalization and nationalism points to the idea that these
supposedly opposite notions do not necessarily contradict. Rather, a critical inquiry of current
state policies and processes suggests that those neoliberal strategies that are
associated with amplified globalization, have in fact allowed, and in some cases even enhanced,
-spatial stratification of ethno-national space (Filc and Ram, 2004; Fenster, 2004).
In other words, despite the changes and adaptations in how the state exercises control over land
and space, the state continues to be the main power determining development patterns in
accordance with its national ideology (Yiftachel, 2006; Tzfadia and Yacobi 2011).
Therefore, the core question that we pose is, not so much whether or not the state has lost
its ability to control and manage national space, but rather what are the ways in which the
privatization of space and spatial planning were integrated into the older patterns of organizing
national space. Our main hypothesis is that while in some cases privatization poses a challenge to
national interests and established order, in many other cases it complements the national project,
in effect cementing existing power relations. How, then, does the state maintain its control and
-
over the distribution of goods and services? What kinds of overlapping between nationalism,
3neoliberalism and colonialism were produced in the process of shifting from a centralized
welfare state to a neoliberal state, but also what contradiction and inconsistencies does this
transformation entail?
Recent planning processes in Jerusalem will serve us as a case study for examining these
questions in depth. As we will explore in more details throughout this article, our analysis is
rooted in critical theories, which refer to the city of Jerusalem through a settler colonial prism
defining it as an ethnocracity (Yacobi, 2009). Settler colonialism denotes states where a new
political order that carried the settlers' own sovereignty was constituted, while the settlers
become a majority of the population and gained control over the land (Wolfe, 2006; Veracini,
2010). Accordingly, by ethnocracity, we refer to cases where a hegemonic ethno-national group
colonizes, appropriates and controls the city apparatus, producing contested spaces of structural
instability. R ,1 we suggest that this allows a more
accurate understanding of Jerusalem . We therefore accentuate the ethnocratic
characteristics of the city, as developed by Yiftachel (2006), i.e. a distinct regime type
established to enhance the expansion and control of a dominant ethno-nation in multi-ethnic
territories. In such regimes, ethnicity, rather than citizenship, form the main criteria for
distributing power and resources. As a result, they typically display high levels of uneven ethnic
segregation. Importantly and highly relevant to this article, ethnocratic regimes can combine a
degree of political openness and formal-democratic representation with political structures that
facilitates the seizure of contested territory by a dominant ethno-national group. During this
process, the dominant group appropriates state apparatuses and control over capital flows while
marginalizing peripheral ethnic and national minorities.
1 In the scope of this article, we will not be able to discuss the vast literature on divided and contested cities. For a
recent and comprehensive review discussing this body of knowledge see: Allegra et. al: 2012
4As an outcome of these and other historical processes, Jerusalem is a sharply polarized
city, both between Jews and Arabs and within Jewish society. Yet, we do not see Jerusalem as an
exception to current global and national power arrangements. Rather, it is an extreme example
that allows us a clear and astute analysis of these p More specifically, in this
article we examine the production of two dwelling configurations which have developed
concurrently in Jerusalem over the last two decades. The first is the intensive planning and
construction of luxury apartments
center (Figure 1 about here). These high-rise compounds mainly house Jews (often religious)
from Western countries, who usually reside in Israel seasonally rather than permanently. A quick
browse through a few of the projects websites2 reveals they market the national project of
Judaizing Jerusalem
directly out of their 21st floor living-room window. The second case, which at first sight seems
fully antithetical to the high-rise gated communities of West Jerusalem, is the recent proliferation
of local zoning plans submitted by Palestinians in East Jerusalem to the Israeli planning
authorities in order to legalize, expand and save their houses from possible demolition (figure 2
about here). This type of act, whether understood as a survival tactic or as the latest expression
of staying put, brings an unmediated Palestinian presence into the heart of Israeli planning
administration, where it had rarely been seen or heard before. In this way, the independent plans
pose a challenge to the ongoing naturalization of the ethno-national project of colonizing
Jerusalem through the bureaucracy of planning.
Each of the above described spatial and planning phenomena have been studied
separately by the authors of this paper. Hence, the purpose of the current paper is to explain how
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5despite the obviously vast differences between the two, both the -planned compounds of
West Jerusalem and the unplanned Palestinian neighborhoods of East Jerusalem are an
outcome of the same tensions between processes of neo-liberalization and privatization of the
Israeli planning system, especially in the realm of housing development, and ongoing
.
While a similar comparison has been discussed by Charney and Rosen (2014) in relation
to high-rise geographies in Jerusalem, our focus is on the politics of planning rather than on the
urban landscape. Hence, rather than examining the roots or symbolic meaning of similar built
forms, this leads us to examine an array of products and outcome of the same planning
apparatuses which operate in all parts of the city, allegedly evenly. In other words, what is
comparable in both cases is the planning methods, tools and assumptions, as well as the role
planning decisions take in wider political contestations. As we will show, the main differences in
outcome are
Allegra, 2016), than they are closely related to the divergence in position within the hierarchical
system of citizenship between each of the agents involved in these planning practices.
Methodologically speaking, such an analysis follows
gins of the injustice and also the
er, 2014:392). Our hypothesis is indeed
important, since most literature on planning and development in contested cities focuses solely
on the ethno-national aspects while overlooking the effects of neoliberal policies in these
contexts (cf. Gaffikin and Morrissey, 2011).
Examining the relationship between the two phenomena the gated high-rises of West
Jerusalem and the independent plans of East Jerusalem - leads us to a few of our central
6arguments; first, we do not only reject the idea that the growing emphasis on market forces has
caused a decline in the effectiveness of state power to shape colonial urban space, but also points
to the ways in which the ethno-national power relations continue to play a central part in the
organization of space through the free market. Second, examining these case studies within one
framework, we demonstrate how planning practices -
, lead to contradicting results. In some
cases, they are complementary to colonial-national discourses, while in others they work to
undermine them. Finally, by revealing the internal contradictions of neo-liberal restructuring, we
emphasize in both cases the links between earlier planning practices and current patterns, rather
than viewing neo-liberalism as indicating a break from them.
Our arguments expand a recent vein of research focusing on the interrelationships
between neo-liberal urban policies and colonial planning in Jerusalem. The work of Shlay and
Rosen (2015) paved the road for understanding the constellation of competing on-the-ground
interests including planning, economy, everyday life and debates over the land and territory.
While some researchers suggest that the current shift of planning policies towards neoliberalism
presents a major shift from national-based planning policy (e.g. Alfasi and Ganan, 2015; Alfasi
and Fenster, 2009;), our work joins others who highlight the paradoxes as well as the
complementary relationships between neo-liberal urban policies and colonization (c.f. Shtern,
2016; Shlomo, 2016; Nolte, 2016; Braier, 2013; Yacobi, 2012). To build such arguments, we
begin by providing a short overview of the changing geopolitics of Jerusalem since the
establishment of the state of Israel, aiming to show how colonial planning in the city was directly
connected to the project of nation and state-building. By contrast to other scholars (c.f.
Benvenisty, 1996; Nitzan-Shiftan, 2004; Misselwitz and Rieniets, 2006), we do not perceive the
71967 war as a turning point, but rather as a moment of up-scaling of previous efforts. In the next
two sections we highlight the relevant findings from our previous research on the two case
studies the high-rise gated communities (Yacobi, 2012 , and the independent plans (Braier,
2013). In both cases our preliminary sources included the planning documents (maps, drawings
and protocols) of the described projects, as well as the planning protocols of the local and district
committees who approved them. In addition, we used secondary sources such as newspapers and
on-site tours to gain a nuanced understanding of the planning proposals.
However, as aforementioned, the main purpose of this article is not to repeat earlier
findings, but to analytically compare the differences and similarities between the two cases, in
order to build the theoretical argument about how neoliberal projects actually work in a colonial
context. Accordingly, in the final part we discuss both housing phenomena in relation to the
Jerusalem 2000 Master Plan. We suggest that Israeli housing policy in Jerusalem displays a dual
condition and polarized dynamics under a seemingly uniform set of governance changes that
take the form of deepening neoliberalism and privatization of the planning arena, but are also
products of overlapping ideology and everyday practice of nationalism, neoliberalism and
colonialism.
Planning Jerusalem as a colonial project
It is beyond the scope of this article to explore in depth the geopolitical transformation of
Jerusalem; yet some details are relevant to our discussion. Jerusalem is currently the largest and
one of the poorest cities in Israel. At the end of 2013 the population of Jerusalem numbered
829,900. The 'Jewish and Other' population totaled 522,200, which are 63%
residents, and the Arab population totaled 307,600, or 37 % of the residents. (The Jerusalem
8Institute Yearly Report, 20153). Beyond the social, economic and cultural divergence between
these two ethno-national populations, they also do not hold the same citizenship status while
Israeli Jerusalemites are both residents of the city and citizens of the state, Palestinian
Jerusalemites are afforded only the partial status of residency, without obtaining full citizenship.
This status provides certain benefits such as freedom of movement and employment in the city,
but prevents any participation in state politics. Furthermore, as part of their refusal to accept
Israeli annexation of the eastern part of the city, practically all Palestinian Jerusalemites abstain
from participating in local politics (though they are not legally prohibited such participation).
The ostensible differences between Israeli and Palestinian neighborhoods in Jerusalem
results from its recent urban history; as widely documented and analyzed (e.g. Dumper, 2014;
Pullan et. al, 2013; Jabareen, 2010; Cohen, 2007), a major spatial turning point in Israel's
geopolitical situation occurred in June 1967, when Israel occupied East Jerusalem and other
territories. Following the occupation, and despite international objections, the Israeli government
issued the Municipalities Ordinance Law (Amendment No. 6), 5727 1967, applying Israeli law,
administration and jurisdiction to East Jerusalem. As a result, Israel annexed Palestinian land and
declared the city of Jerusalem as its united capital city.
While Israeli rhetoric declared Jerusalem a unified city, its planning policies have
reflected the paradigm of a colonial city (Bollens, 2000). Both state and city governments have
pursued the same general policy, which persistently promoted the Judaization of Jerusalem - i.e.
the expansion of Jewish political, territorial, demographic and economic control (Yiftachel and
Yacobi, 2002). Over the past 46 years, Israel has used its military might and economic power to
relocate borders and form boundaries, grant and deny rights and resources, shift populations and
3 http://www.jiis.org.il/.upload/yearbook/2015/general_table_heb.pdf. (Retrieved 26.7.16).
9reshape the Occupied Territories, for the purpose of ensuring Jewish control (Dumper, 2014).
Following the construction of the Separation Barrier, Israel is in the process of extending the
metropolitan territory of Jerusalem by an additional 160 km² of the Occupied Territories (known
as Area E), beyond the 70 km² annexed immediately after the end of the 1967 war. The
Separation Wall marks this additional territory, located at the eastern edge of the city, as part of
the Israeli city, de facto enforcing Israel's political borders in Jerusalem. At the same time, the
geographic continuum and functional integration of the Palestinian neighborhoods are disrupted,
while the Arab city as a whole is isolated by the Wall from its Palestinian suburbs and hinterland
(Amir, 2011).
Indeed, the dynamics outlined above, namely colonial power and governance in an urban
context, the demarcation of borders and boundaries, the creation of a hierarchy of urban
citizenship as well as the attempt of city dwellers to symbolically and tangibly appropriate space,
et. al, 2013) and the
role of planning in the production of urban space as we will detail in the following sections.
The neoliberal project #1: gated communities
In recent years, Jerusalem has attracted more Jewish immigrants from Western countries, who do
not live permanently in Israel, than any other city in Israel, especially from the United States,
United Kingdom and France (CBS, 2009; 2010; 2012). These immigrants, known in Israeli
do not disperse s neighborhoods, but tend
to concentrate in the wealthier, inner-city neighborhoods, such as Rehavia, Talbiya, Baka, and
the German Colony (Haramati and Hananel, 2016). Recently arrived immigrants are attracted to
neighborhoods which already house other immigrants from the same country (Zaban, 2016), and
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that reflect their particular religious preferences and economic capabilities. The numbers are
telling; according to Leurer (2007), during 2006-2007 foreign residents bought approximately 35
percent of the apartments in the central neighborhoods mentioned above, while their number in
the city in general has reached 10 percent. In Jerusalem's city center itself around 10,000 housing
units are owned by foreign residents.4
While this influx of wealthy foreign has caused major price hikes in the
local real-estate market,5 pricing many existing residents out of central city neighborhoods, it has
also given rise to a new typology of housing in the city, which we refer to as the -rise
These compounds are designed as urban gated communities, composed of luxury-
apartment complexes with a building volume and height that far exceeds its typical surroundings.
They are usually equipped with indulging amenities like a private cocktail bar, conference rooms
and a swimming pool. Significantly, they also provide upgraded security systems, such as
electric gates, security guards and CCTV cameras.6
concerns, these projects appropriate public spaces or the accessibility to them for private use of
the residents.7 Furthermore, they change the diversity and character of the businesses around
them (Haramati and Hananel, 2016)
The accumulative effect of these compounds is the production of a privatized zone,
amidst previously public urban spaces (cf. Tzfadia, 2008; Yacobi and Cohen, 2007; Alfasi and
Ganan, 2015). At least 8 such compounds were built in the center of West Jerusalem in the last
4 For an updated and comprehensive discussion see: Zaban 2016
5 The Marker,
Ynet 17.05.15.
6 See, for example: http://jerusalem-of-gold.co.il/Heb/Index.asp?CategoryID=84
7 See for example: Urban scheme 2925 (Kfar David); Urban scheme 2080B (Haneviim Court); Urban scheme 4715
s
some of these plans.
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decade or so, and 10 more are currently under development (Alfasi and Ganan, 2015; Charney
and Rosen, 2014; Yacobi, 2012), causing a significant transformation in the urban landscape of
However, as Alfasi and Ganan note, from an institutional planning perspective,
these complexes are not part of an overall plan or policy for the city center, nor are they initiated
by any public body. Rather, they are an outcome of private entrepreneurship, and in few cases of
public-private partnership dominated by the latter, -
authorities, which are planned and negotiated on an individual base. The developers of these
compounds are private, well established companies, backed by experienced architects and
planners who worked extensively in the city for several decades. Their ability to negotiate
building rights is based on the fact that there is no authorized Master Plan to the city (as we will
discuss it in details in the last section), and thus negotiations of local spot plans is the common
practice. From the legal point of view, each of the projects is an individually amended exception
to the statutory land-use plan. This lack of general planning allows the planning authorities
central role in the privatization process to fade into the background, while clearing the front stage
for private market developers (c.f. Margalit and Alfasi, 2016).
The gated high-rise compounds are mainly marketed to affluent foreign residents and
immigrants from Western countries. It is important to note that many of these
differ from other immigrants in that they spend only part of the year in Jerusalem,
and the other part in their country of origin. As a result, large parts of the massive apartment
complexes stand empty much of the year (Zaban, 2016; Yacobi, 2012; Luerer, 2007). This
immigration pattern is institutionally supported by providing tax benefits and exemptions
designed to enable Jewish "global" business people to migrate to Israel while simultaneously
12
allowing them to continue managing their businesses from their previous country of residence.8
Moreover, it was reported that foreign investors who buy apartments in Israel will receive
favorable terms on mortgages such as unlimited fixed rate foreign currency from Israeli banks.
This is in contrast to Israeli property buyers, who must accord with the Bank of Israel's
restrictions on foreign currency mortgages, where interest rates may change dramatically over a
short period (Yacobi, 2012: 2711)
Thus, the proliferation of gated high-
local manifestation of transnational flows of highly privileged people and their capital, which has
its own particularities. In the case presented here, the capacity to draw global investors to the
city, is strongly based on the religious and national centrality of Jerusalem, and the role its built
environment plays in the manufacturing of territorial identity. The visual message conveyed in
marketing and construction refabricates historic and religious connections to the
past, while eliminating its contested geopolitical present. The "spirit" of the city is encapsulated
in its stone architecture and the refurbishment of historic façades, while the social construction of
its authenticity serves as an approval of the Zionist project in Jerusalem (Nitzan Shiftan, 2004).
These migration and settlement patterns can be explained as based on the logic of the free
market, property rights and market competition, which are at the core of the neo-liberal
discourse, and in turn, shape temporary spatial practices such as urban planning, land policy and
housing policy (Harvey, 2005). According to this approach, in order to acquire urban goods and
services such as housing, individuals compete in a free and open market which is not affected by
any priorities in allocation derived from affiliation with the state. Indeed, the present-day form of
gated communities leads to the production of a neo-liberal cityscape through notions of
8 Amendment 168 of the Ordinance "Law for the Encouragement of immigration and return to Israel" (2008).
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privatization and globalization (Rosen and Razin, 2008; 2009; Charney and Rosen, 2014; Alfasi
and Ganan, 2015). However, viewing the production of such neo-liberal spaces as part of the
weakening of state intervention is misleading, because, as Rosen and Razin argue, neo-liberal
urban regimes do not imply the demise of regulation "but rather its changing nature" (2009:
1703).
As the prevailing literature has stressed, the state plays a crucial role in shaping neo-
liberal policies and thus always crafts certain goals (cf. Blakely and Snyder, 1997). While this
body of knowledge highlights the interests of certain class, ethnic or race groups it overlooks the
role of neo-liberal policies in advancing geopolitical objectives. The centralized control
exercised by the state is obscured by the neo-liberal discourse on "freedom", which in practice
benefits particular private bodies such as investors, developers and entrepreneurs. Advancing this
argument further, we propose that unveiling the ways in which the "free-market" operates, can
expose the influential role of the state and its bureaucratic apparatuses on the organization of the
urban landscape. In other words, (2004) view of the interrelationships
we further suggest that in the case of the gated
high-rise compounds, the "free-market" has largely become a gatekeeper of the city which
constantly aims to control the spatial and demographic dominance of one group of residents over
another, i.e. keeping the Jewish population a majority in the city.
The neoliberal project #2: independent plans
Whereas the gated high-rise compounds increasingly dominate the cityscape of West Jerusalem
center, the Eastern part of the city has also seen significant urban development in the last two
decades. This accelerated growth, however, is of a very different nature.
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colonization efforts, which in recent years include, inter alia, the intensification of residency
revocations for Palestinian Jerusalemites living in the West Bank and abroad, and the
construction of the Separation Wall amid the urban built-up area, have endangered the residential
status of Palestinians living in the city (Parsons and Salter, 2008; Amir, 2011).
Coupled with severe restrictions on Palestinian urban development, these policies have
considerably intensified pressures on the already limited housing market of East Jerusalem
(Brooks et al, 2009; Chiodelli, 2012a). As a result, informal housing development, namely the
construction of houses without acquiring building permits from city government, have become
commonplace. In 2010, there were an estimated 15,000-20,000 unauthorized housing units,
which comprise over 40% of all Palestinian housing units in the city (Schaeffer, 2011). By
contrast, since 1967 not even one public housing unit - planned, constructed or finances by the
municipality or the state - was built for Palestinians in Jerusalem. Hence, the widespread practice
of informal housing production, alongside other informal services and infrastructure, has become
one of the most evident features of urban development in the Palestinian part of the city.
National and municipal authorities continuously attempt to enforce the Israeli law on the
East Jerusalem's urban space by means of fines, house demolition orders, and executed
demolitions. These policies of restriction and demolition are profoundly suppressing for
Palestinian urban development and political activity in the city. However, a closer look at
'ground-level' planning processes reveals additional activities that do not always adhere to the
ethno-national logic of state policies. A different reaction set off by the practice of informal
construction and the threat of demolition, is a seemingly marginal yet growing scope of
independent plans submitted by Palestinians to the Jerusalem District Planning and Building
Committee (Braier, 2013). Most of these 'spot-zoning' (i.e. local, detailed) plans are initiated by
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private residents, or small groups of self-organized landowners, in order to protect against
demolition, legalize a house or to make small improvements to existing houses. Due to strict land
ownership proof requirements, these plans are limited in scope, applying to only small fractions
of Palestinian land. In most cases, their objective is to re-zone the land, usually from 'green area'9
to residential use, and to increase the building rights on the plots.
The submission of an independent plan serves a double purpose: it protects homeowners
from demolitions, and creates small-scale opportunities for expansion. This dual nature combines
survival alongside gradual improvement and accumulation. Hence, this action presents not a
direct opposition to the prevailing power relationship in the city, but rather a form of "quiet
encroachment" on state mechanism and power (Bayat, 2000). Similar to the informal housing
construction itself, the submissions of these plans are uncoordinated, non-collective, actions
derived from individual needs, which do not necessarily reflect wider considerations. Similar to
the gated high-rise compounds, their most significant effects are of cumulative nature, in this
case in two senses: individually, they are formulated not only in terms of defensive resistance but
also to accommodate growth; collectively, their power lies in the agglomeration of small and
quiet but nevertheless direct acts within the planning system.
Since the mid-90s and until the end of the first decade of the 2000s, there has been a
steady increase in the number of independent plans in East Jerusalem submitted to the Jerusalem
Planning and Building District Committee. The number of validated plans (i.e. plans receiving
final authorization) has risen from just a handful per year in the beginning of the 1990s to a few
dozen each during the first decade of the 2000s (Braier, 2013). In terms of housing units this
9 In the Israeli land-use code, various open area and landscaping categories are generally indicated by the color
green. However, in the context of the history of planning in Israel in general and in Jerusalem in particular these
zoning categories were abused for obscuring national and political goals (cf. Misselwitz and Rieniets, 2006).
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amounts to around 1,000 units approved each year, some in advance but most retroactively. In
sum, approximately 800 plans in Palestinian neighborhoods were approved since 1967 until 2012
(Bimkom, 201410). Of these, only 120 were approved between 1967 and 1998, most of which
were general neighborhood plans and infrastructure plans rather than detailed housing plans.
Only very few of these plans actually allowed for building permits to be acquired.11 By contrast,
between 1999 and 2012, some 680 plans were approved, the vast majority of which were local,
independent plans, primarily aimed at expanding and authorizing housing opportunities. Granted
that the significant growth of independent plans is still marginal compared with the extent to
which Palestinian development is being stifled, these numbers do demonstrate that a decade and
a half of independent plans has created unprecedented planning activity in East Jerusalem. In
other words, after decades of planning which did little to improve on-the-ground conditions and
led to a de-facto inability of the state to promote large-scale plans in Palestinian East Jerusalem,
the independent plans allowed at least a certain measure of progress. This is limited to individual
land-owners, who possess enough economic as well as symbolic capital to promote their own
plans.
desire, these plans do not promote any kind of collective action, at least in their current form.
The notable increase in independent plans can be ascribed, to a large extent, to the 43rd
-
promote
'free-market' oriented planning practices. As demonstrated by the case of the gated high-rise
compounds of West Jerusalem, such policies primarily benefit economically powerful Jewish-
10 The data was collected using the website of the Planning Administration at the Ministry of Interior, for a long-
11 In the Israeli planning system, the planning permit is the last link of the document chain one must obtain in order
for a house to be considered legal.
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Israeli private actors of the real-estate market, who in turn promote national goals (cf. Tzfadia
and Yacobi, 2015). Similar neoliberal practices of deregulation have been criticized for
increasing social stratification and spatial inequalities (Harvey 2005; Peck et al 2009).
Particularly in the context of fierce geopolitical struggle and asymmetric power relations, the
uneven economic effects of deregulation have been shown to follow the same ethno-national
lines of colonial divisions, despite their alleged neutrality towards national and ethnic affiliations
(Shafir and Peled 2002, Filc and Ram 2004).
And yet, the independent plans submitted by Palestinians in East Jerusalem differ from
this pattern, since by contrast to the gated high rise compounds they do not represent significant
capital nor national interests. They reveal both how deregulation can potentially decrease social
inequality, and that the ethno-national logic does not always work hand in hand with the
neoliberal logic. Precisely in a context where regulation has been deployed in order to advance a
hyper-ethno-national logic, deregulation can become an opportunity. In the case of the
independent plans, it has opened a new course of action that allows excluded residents to
consolidate their presence in the city and directly partake in the planning of their environs. This
is not to say, however, that the submission of independent plans poses a direct opposition to the
colonial power relationships in the city, because working from within the bureaucratic system of
governance always runs the risk of enforcing and reproducing state coercion. Yet the excess of
independent plans exposes the ethno-national logic under which the committee operates thereby
destabilizing its proclaimed neutrality and professionalism. Such destabilizing is a structural
effect of accumulative pressure, regardless of benevolence or and political
positions.
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This form of Palestinian encroachment on the Israeli institutional system dwells on the
contradictions between ethno-national logics of separation and oppression, modernist notions of
rational-comprehensive planning, and neoliberal mechanisms of market-driven urban
development. The case demonstrates that it is in the process of urban place-making, rather than
on the state level, that such contradictions between the national ideology and market-oriented
policies appear. This is because the urban scale provides a site for the articulation of demands
that cannot be accommodated on the national scale due to political constraints. These demands
include claiming substantial rights while rejecting the political citizenship to which they are
usually attributed. In the long run, such practices challenge the common view of the relationship
between territory, sovereignty and citizenship as being inseparable.
Conclusion: from regulation to manipulation
The Jerusalem master Plan, known also Plan, is the first comprehensive
scheme Jerusalem
plan, which has never been authorized but is used as planning guidelines, suggests a
comprehensive spatial vision of the city in the twenty-first century. Yet, as analyzed by several
planning scholars and activists (Bimkom, 2009; Jabareen, 2010; Chiodelli, 2012b) the
plan reproduces the colonial logic of demographic and geographic control and
unequal distribution of urban goods for the Palestinian residents of the city, especially in the field
of housing (Chiodelli, 2012b). It is important to note that since this master-plan was never
officially approved, it has also never been scrutinized by the public eye. Despite being criticized
for continuing to exclude Palestinians from urban affairs and enhancing Jewish dominancy over
the city,
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the reverse argument that it grants Palestinian Jerusalemites too many building opportunities.
Nonetheless, the Jerusalem planning authorities regard the plan as a general policy guide. We
would suggest that reflects and accentuates the shift from
centralistic approach which is based on authorized master plans (and thus a legally approved
document) into a neo-liberal planning apparatus any legal commitment (and
hence open to negotiations and interpretations).
To put it differently, such transition from centralistic planning and regulation into what
we understand as a plan open for manipulation enables private initiatives to develop high-rise
gated communities in the city center, without ever stating an official policy on the issue.
Furthermore, the idea of stalling such developments until a more comprehensive plan is in place
(a common practice in East Jerusalem, as we will soon see) seems to the planners to be absurd in
this case.12 For many planners and policy-makers, the gated high-rise compounds sprouting in
West Jerusal
the architectural qualities of Jerusalem, and for revitalizing urban public space (Alfasi and
Ganan, 2015). The neoliberal discourses, images and vocabulary through which they are
conceived and implemented in Jerusalem become effective tools for obscuring the geopolitical
goals and the ethnic and class segregation produced by entrepreneurial projects described as
, as the Mayor Nir Barkat states in his vision for the
city:
12 District Planning and Building Committee protocol, Plan No.2080b (Haneviim Court),
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There is room for everyone in Jerusalem Arabs, Jews, ultra-Orthodox, and secular
and we have to develop the city in a way that will enable the different populations to stay
and enjoy the power of the city.13
Yet, a few lines later, the demographic vision for the city is revealed, exposing who is supposed
to benefit from such progress:
The current population ratio is one-third Muslim, two-thirds Jewish, and two percent
Christian. We anticipate that growth will be proportional to the current ratio, and all
municipal planning is derived from that assumption (ibid).
Analyzing the relationship between neoliberal adjustments and ethno-national goals leads to an
understanding of the ways in which housing policies become not only a stratification instrument,
but also a mechanism for advancing appropriation of public space through continued
privatization. Such mechanisms simultaneously rely on local administrative regulation of
resources (such as tax exemptions) as well as the commodification of the symbolic assets of the
city, and the global discourses of security, protection and lifestyle. While the latter highlights the
similarity of these projects to gated communities around the world (cf. Caldeira, 2000), the
former reveals the particularity of the national and religious relationships to Jerusalem.
In relation to East Jerusalem, the reversed mirror image of the above is expressed when
after adopting the 2000 plan as official policy planning officials began to routinely reject plans in
areas designated for future expansion, mandating a neighborhood plan to be in place before any
further planning takes place. While this allows small, incremental plans within the built-up fabric
to advance within the planning system, ultimately getting approved, the requirement to prepare a
13 Jeru http://jcpa.org/article/the-
mayors-vision-for-jerusalem/ retrieved: 9.9.2016
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large, neighborhood-scale plans in practice prevents any authorized construction in new areas.
This is because in the current system such plans, even when they do get commissioned, are
extremely hard to approve in East Jerusalem, take exceedingly long time to process, and usually
do not suffice in order to obtain a building permit. In this way, inward legalization and minor
densification through the practice of independent plans provides the planning system with a way
to release some of the pressure to improve conditions in the Palestinian neighborhoods. Yet, by
strictly following the technical procedures of the Master plan wider, development continues to be
stifled. Hence, the unapproved 2000 Master plan allows both modes of operation - the flexible
use of the guidelines as practiced to enhance high-end development in s center,
simultaneously with strict
mundane development in East Jerusalem.
Whereas the gated high-rise compounds can be described as hyper-planned and over-
regulated spaces, where movements and activities are constantly monitored, the Palestinian
informal spaces of East Jerusalem are perceived as chaotic spaces of illegality, developing
outside and against the formal planning system. For planning officials this type of development
represents either indifference or conscious contempt towards both the rationality of planning and
the rule of law. Hence, the only way to face such challenges to the sovereignty of the law is by
erasure. In these spaces, the Palestinian struggle to cross the complex paths of the bureaucratic
planning system emerges as a form of contestation over the right to spatial recognition. Adopting
the urban context as an arena for negotiating rights and demands, the Palestinians who submit
such plans recognize the power of the governmental agencies but aim to use it to their own ends,
enhancing their presence in the city. As small-scale, yet direct, acts operating from within the
institutional planning system they must employ the structural categories of urban planning. But
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in their use of those very categories, they simultaneously aim to undermine the national and
professional logic which lays at the basis of this system, trapping the planning bureaucrats
between the contradicting powers of ethno-nationalism and neoliberalism.
Following Ananya Roy (2011) we argue that such informal urban development cannot be
viewed as external to the planning system, as planning's (and in this particular case, as the gated
ultimate Other: that which cannot be planned and therefore cannot be governed or
controlled. Rather, the unplanned and the hyper-planned in Jerusalem should be viewed in
tandem, as they are both outcomes of the same governmental logic through which differentiating
spatial values are produced and managed. These bureaucratic mechanisms simultaneously serve
two projects the colonial project and the neoliberal project. Such an understanding, we
conclude, allows us to move away from the idea that the gated high-rise compounds of West
Jerusalem and the independent plans of East Jerusalem are two complete oppositions, which can
in no sense be reconciled. Instead, we determine that both are outcomes of the same complex of
power-relation between nationalism, colonialism and neoliberalism which in turn shape the
contemporary urban spaces of Jerusalem. We have pointed to processes that extend beyond the
discursive dimension and reach the spatial-material realm; recognizing the importance of space
as a concrete arena for material practices, which produce the physical space in colonial contexts
(King, 2003).
The parallel examination of both phenomena shows that both result from deregulation
and neo-liberalization of planning practices, and from the internal tensions these changes create
within the colonial project of producing metropolitan Jerusalem. The development of gated high-
rise compounds and of the independent plans relies on the same administrative and regulatory
-
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small-scale, isolated plans that aim to promote a specific, usually profit driven project on an
individual basis and regardless of over-all plans. As several scholars show (Alfasi and Ganan,
2015; Margalit and Alfasi, 2016), s -scale privatization
with public assets, i.e. publicly-owned land and public facilities. The growing dependence of
authorities on private capital for infrastructural improvements limits development to market
tendencies while compromising the public interest, intensifying the neglect of poor urban areas
and exacerbating social, economic and spatial inequality in the city (see also Hasson and Hazan,
1997). This form of neoliberal governance, which encourages both institutions and individuals to
conform to market norms while transferring the costs and responsibilities of development on to
their shoulders, but not the decision making power, has led to evermore uneven spatial
development (Harvey 2005).
As we have shown in the case of Jerusalem, those same practices can nonetheless lead to
contradictory results. This is because the practice of urban production does not operate in both
cases from the same position within the power structure that results from the tensions between
nationalism, colonialism and neoliberalism. The proliferation of the gated compounds marks a
planning strategy that binds together political power and financial sway in order to advance the
goal of Jewish domination over Jerusalem (Fenster, 2012)
accommodate such development with excessive building rights which translates into their much
disputed vertical urbanism (Charney and Rosen, 2014; Harris, 2015) attests to the ways
neoliberalism and nationalism complement each other in this case. By contrast, at the Planning
and Building Committee discussions over the Palestinian independent plans every minor height
addition must be agonistically negotiated. Hence, the submission of independent plans can be
understood as a tactic of re-appropriating the neoliberal planning strategies mentioned above into
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a different political power-relation, whereby extensive domination may only be fought on an
individual basis of staying put. Moreover, because the independent plans are based on individual
entrepreneurial initiative that leans on neoliberal logic and discourse, the effort to save the
individual home may come at the cost of community claims and political mobilization. In some
cases they offer the municipality an opportunity to incorporate much needed public spaces into
private housing developments, but most of all they provide a limited avenue for development
which helps the system cope with contradicting pressures.
Such retooling of planning practices highlights the possibility of tactic maneuvers and
manipulations, taking advantage of evasive opportunities rather than operating solely through
strategic interventions. Though they cannot fundamentally alter the power-relations that are
dictated by wider political processes, the Palestinian who submit independent plans challenge the
ongoing naturalization of the bureaucracy of the colonizers, voicing their distress within the
system. While the political impacts of the independent plans are usually limited, this tactic of re-
appropriation fractures the hidden unity of the neoliberal planning strategy with colonial
practices by revealing its inconsistency and contradictions. Under this colonial regime, the urban
becomes a form of control through strategies of mapping, categorization, reorganization and
management, which delineate the scope of possibilities. The potential of the city to be a
liberating force, however, lays in its potential to offer possibilities for unraveling the dictated
order by using everyday tactics of re-appropriation and re-tooling.
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